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CASE NOTES
Antitrust Law--Strict Standards of Clayton Act Held Not Applicable
to Bank Mergers Under 1966 Bank Merger Act.-The Comptroller of the
Currency approved the defendants" proposed bank merger under the standards
of the 1960 Bank Merger Act.2 The Department of Justice attacked the pro-
posed merger as being violative of the Sherman3 and Clayton4 Acts, but its
application for a preliminary injunction was denied., After a trial on the merits,
judgment was postponed while the court awaited passage of legislation affecting
the merger.0 In the first decision under the 1966 Bank Merger Act,1 the dis-
trict court returned the case to the Comptroller for further consideration of
the advisability of the merger under the guidelines contained in the 1966 act
before a review de novo would be granted. United States v. Crocker-Anglo
Nat'l Bank, Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) 1 71898 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6,
1966).
Resolving the conflict between the needs of the financial community and
necessary antitrust legislation is a difficult endeavor. Such legislation must
mediate between the merits of preserving competition by prohibiting certain
bank mergers and the need to prevent excessive competition which could lead
to bank failures.8 Congress attempted to balance these interests in the Bank
Merger Act of 19609 by allowing the banking agencies' ° to determine the
1. The defendants were the Crocker-Anglo National Bank, the Citizens National Bank,
and the Transamerica Corporation.
2. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 US.C. § 1828(c) (1964).
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
4. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
5. United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
6. The Comptroller approved the merger on September 30, 1963. Eight days later the
Department of Justice filed its suit. While the trial was in progress, the Senate passed its
version of a bill exempting the bank, and all banks, from similar government suits. S. 1698,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966). Judgment was postponed until final legislation by both houses
could be completed. The final bill, the 1966 Bank Merger Act, did not exclude the Crocker-
Anglo merger because it was consummated after United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 US. 321 (1963), was decided, and, thus, the drafters felt that the defendants knew, at
the time of the merger, that the courts would apply the Clayton Act to bank mergers. Only
mergers consummated prior to June 17, 1963, were given exemption. Congress did feel, how-
ever, that the new substantive law should apply. See H.R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong, 2d
Sess. 4-5 (1966).
7. 80 Stat. 7, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1966).
8. The problem is made more acute since, until 1959, large banking institutions were
permitted to develop unhampered by the antitrust laws. See Seeley, Banks and Antitrust,
83 Banking L.J. 1035, 1036 (1966). Strict application of the antitrust laws now would
inhibit the development of banks able to compete with the larger financial institutions. The
merger disapproved in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), for
example, would have resulted in greater competition on the national level. See id. at 370.
9. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964).
10. The act intended to have the agency most familiar with the banks proposing merger
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advisability of each proposed merger. The act, however, did not make clear
what antitrust standards should be applied by the courts in reviewing the ap-
propriate agency's decision. The United States Supreme Court, in a much criti-
cized opinion, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank," ruled that the Clayton
Act applied to bank mergers, thus prescribing standards for determining the
advisability of such mergers which differed from those employed by the bank-
ing agencies. The result was to nullify the 1960 act,'2 which was intended to
enact criteria broader than those in the Clayton Act for examining a proposed
bank merger.13 The latter provides that a merger should be prohibited if "in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly1114
The Supreme Court unexpectedly applied these standards to the merger in the
Philadelphia Bank case by considering the line of commerce of commercial
banking only,15 excluding all other financial activities.'0 The appropriate sec-
tion of the country was limited to the four-county metropolitan area, although
the purpose of the merger was to enable the Philadelphia banks to compete with
New York City financial institutions.' 7 While the Bank Merger Act of 1960
intended the appropriate agency to approve a merger upon a determination
that it was in the public interest after considering several factors, among them
competition,' the Philadelphia Bank ruling would disallow such a merger if it
consider the merger. National and district banks were considered by the Comptroller of the
Currency; state banks, other than district banks, by the Federal Reserve Board; and non-
member state banks, other than district banks, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion. Ibid.
11. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See Celler, The Philadelphia National Bank Case: A Rejoinder,
1 National Banking Rev. 229 (1963); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 Harv. L. Rev.
79, 159 (1963); Comment, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 990 (1964).
12. "The result is, of course, that the Bank Merger Act is almost completely nullified; Its
enactment turns out to have been an exorbitant waste of congressional time and energy. As
the present case illustrates, the Attorney General's report to the designated banking agency
is no longer truly advisory, for if the agency's decision is not satisfactory a § 7 suit may
be commenced immediately. . . .The only vestige of the Bank Merger Act which remains
is that the banking agencies will have an initial veto." 374 U.S. at 384-85 (dissenting
opinion). (Footnotes omitted.)
13. See S. Rep. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959); Comment, 71 Yale L.J. 502
(1962). One of thfe reasons for passing the 1960 act was the thought that section 7 of the
Clayton Act could not reach a bank merger. See, e.g., 106 Cong. Rec. 7257 (1960) (remarks
of Representative Spence).
14. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
15. 374 U.S. at 356-57.
16. Competition to commercial banks in supplying credit comes from "mutual savings
banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, personal-finance companies, sales-finance
companies, private businessmen . . . Small Business Investment Corporations, life insurance
companies." Id. at 327 n.5.
17. Id. at 360 n.37.
18. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964). The factors are: "the financial
history and condition of each of the banks involved, the adequacy of its capital structure,
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failed only the test of anticompetitive or monopolistic effect."' The 1966 act
would allow some mergers with anticompetitive effects:
The responsible agency shall not approve-
(A) any proposed merger transaction which would result in a monopoly, or which
would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to
attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the United States, or
(B) any other proposed merger transaction whose effect in any section of the
country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,
or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the
public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience
and needs of the community to be served. In every case, the responsible agency shall
take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects
of the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and needs of the
community to be served.20
One of the biggest disagreements between the banking agencies and the
Department of Justice prior to enactment of the new legislation revolved around
the substantive law concerning the definition of the relevant market.21 The
Justice Department contended that the new bill should not and did not change
the prior definition.2 2 But the language of the new statute omitted the Clayton
Act phrase, "in any line of commerce," 2 3 thereby indicating a desire on the
part of the drafters to broaden the test by requiring an appraisal of the overall
effect of the merger upon competition rather than a search for anticompetitive
effects in any one line of commerce.2 4 The insertion in the statute of the require-
its future earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the convenience and
needs of the community to be served, and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent
with the purposes of [the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act] .... [T]he appro-
priate agency shall also take into consideration the effect of the transaction on competi-
tion . .. ." Ibid.
19. 374 U.S. at 385 (dissenting opinion). See 112 Cong. Rec. 2343 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
20. 80 Stat. 7 (1966), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c)(5) (Supp. 1966).
21. H.R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). In defining such markets, "it is
not so easy in the case of the larger banks, which serve a local market of individuals and
small businesses, but which are also competing in the regional or national financial markets
for the opportunity to place large loans with major corporations which are shopping the
country for funds." Id. at 3.
22. Hearings on S. 1698 Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House
Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 172 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings].
23. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), provides in part: "No
corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part
of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation . . . where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."
24. Note, The 1966 Amendment to the Bank Merger Act, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 764, 780
(1966). See also 112 Cong. Rec. 2541 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966) (remarks of Senator Robertson).
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ment that, even if restraint of trade is established, the "public interest" and
the "needs of the community to be served" must be weighed against that effect,
seems to validate the latter interpretation.
In United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank,2r an action was brought under
section 7 of the Clayton Act to enjoin the defendants' 20 merger within thirty
days27 of the Comptroller of the Currency's approval of the merger. The court
stated that it "does not sustain the position of Justice that it is entitled to sue
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The only suit open to Justice to enjoin a
bank merger lies solely within the ambit of BMA-66. '28 It held, however, that
since the suit had only reached a preliminary stage, the Department of Justice
would be able to amend its complaint to come under the act since it had alleged
an antitrust violation.n
While the Provident Bank case did not discuss the manner in which the new
rules would be applied, the instant court, being first to hear a case under the
new act,30 provided some guidelines for the administrative agencies to use in
considering the advisability of proposed bank mergers. The court requested the
Comptroller to make new specific findings as to the anticompetitive effects of
the merger and to determine "whether, assuming that the merger has the effect
upon potential competition which the Government claims, that effect would be
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in
meeting the interest and convenience of the community to be served." 31 The
principal issue underlying the Provident Bank and instant cases revolves around
the role and status of banks in the economy. If they are to be considered similar
to other industries, then it is advisable to have the narrow rules outlined in the
Clayton Act apply to bank mergers as well as any other merger. This would
result in a court review of the advisability of each proposed merger utilizing
Clayton Act standards. However, Congress has decided that the competitive
practices of other industries should not be tolerated if they would in any way
lead to bank failures. Thus, the administrative agencies, whose members can
utilize expert judgment and specialized knowledge of this unique and intricate
industry, seem to be the proper forum for such decisions.
An examination of the criticism of the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case, the 1960
Bank Merger Act, and the legislative history of the 1966 Bank Merger Act,
whose purpose is "to reverse a decision of the Supreme Court,' 82 indicates that
the advisability of bank mergers is not intended to be judged solely by the
25. Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) 9 71931, at 83277 (ED. Pa. Oct. 13, 1966), prob.
juris. noted, 35 U.S.L. Week 3253 (Jan. 23, 1967) (No. 972).
26. Defendants were Provident National Bank and Central-Penn National Bank of
Philadelphia.
27. 80 Stat. 7 (1966), 12 U.S.CA. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (Supp. 1966). See note 45 infra.
28. Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) ff 71931, at 83281.
29. Id. at 83280.
30. 112 Cong. Rec. 24867 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1966).
31. Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) g1 71898, at 83159. (Footnote omitted.)
32. 112 Cong. Rec. 2538 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
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standard of anticompetitive effect. 33 Senator Robertson, chief Senate architect
of the legislation, stated that "this bill, should convince the courts that the
Congress does not intend that mergers in the banking field should be measured
solely by the antitrust considerations which are applied in other industries."-1
Although the intent of the drafters was to provide "a single set of standards
for the consideration of future mergers by the banking supervisory agencies,
the Department of Justice, and the courts under the antitrust laws,"35 the legis-
lation may not accomplish that purpose since no clear definitions of such terms
as "public interest," "clearly outweighed," "convenience and needs" and "com-
munity" are provided. Under the 1960 act, which was equally vague, the agen-
cies were inconsistent in determining what factors should be weighed in their
consideration of the advisability of proposed mergers.30 In determining the
33. The instant court made reference to an analogous line of cases heard by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) ff 71898, at 83156-57. The Inter-
state Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 906 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(b) (1964), provides that the
ICC may approve a merger violative of the Clayton Act or other antitrust laws so long
as it finds, after weighing the effects of a lessening of competition against the advantages
of improved service, that the merger is "consistent with the public interest." In Seaboard
Air Line R.R. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154 (1965) (per curiam), the Supreme Court re-
manded a case in which the district court had set aside the ICC's approval of a railroad
merger because the commission had not determined if the merger violated § 7 of the Clayton
Act. The Court stated that the district court had failed to reach "the ultimate question
whether the merger would be consistent with the public interest despite the foreseeable in-
jury to competition." Id. at 156. (Footnote omitted.) The commission must not ignore the
antitrust laws, McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1944), but it
may approve mergers otherwise violative of antitrust laws if they are in the public interest.
Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959). The administrative agency
and not the court should determine what is consistent with public interest. Cf. Purcell v.
United States, 315 U.S. 381 (1942); Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 351 (1915);
ICC v. Illinois Central R.R., 215 U.S. 452 (1910). Representative Moorhead felt that the
public interest aspects of the 1966 Bank Merger Act should be given the same weight as has
been given by the ICC and the courts to mergers heard under the Interstate Commerce Act.
112 Cong. Rec. 2340 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966). The instant court agreed. Trade Reg. Rep.
(1966 Trade Cas.) U 71898, at 83156-60.
34. 112 Cong. Rec. 2541 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). "The bill would require the courts to
use the new standards of the bill in all . . . 'post-Philadelphia' cases now pending in
court . . . . It is a primary purpose of the bill to assure that the courts will never again
dismiss as irrelevant the question of the need of a community." 112 Cong. Rec. 2339 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 1966) (remarks of Representative Ashley). "These provisions . . . provide a
banking standard that may allow economic assistance to a community even though a merger
tends to lessen competition in that community." 112 Cong. Rec. 2343 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966)
(remarks of Representative Stanton).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
36. See House Hearings 185-87. The justice Department frequently finds anticompeti-
tive effects. The banking agencies tend not to do so. Since 1960 the agencies approved over
700 mergers. During that period, the justice Department found adverse competitive effects
in 470 cases. Id. at 175.
1967] CASE NOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
competitive effects, credit unions, personal loan companies, and federal lending
institutions,3 7 as well as mutual savings banks,38 were included upon occasion,
yet in other cases, the agencies failed to make any mention of competition from
non-banking institutions at all. 39 The public interest factors also posed problems
as the agencies seemed undecided as to whether the banks must show benefit to
the public40 or whether the New York State approach,41 that of showing harm
to the public before denying the application,42 was the proper method for basing
its rulings.
43
There is also the problem, raised by the instant case, of de novo review of
an administrative agency decision. The requirement of the new act that the
courts review the agency's judgment of the anticompetitive effects of a merger
presents little problem as the courts have traditionally made such decisions.
4
The de novo provisions,45 however, also require review of the second feature of
the agency's determination, whether the anticompetitive results of the merger
will be outweighed by the advantage to the community to be served. Tradi-
tionally, this type of determination has been considered a legislative or executive
one and thus not reviewable by the courts40 under article III of the Constitu-
tion. The instant court concluded that the findings of the Comptroller concern-
ing the "convenience and needs" test could be reviewed under the more limited
substantial evidence rule.47 This rule requires examination of the agency's ruling
37. 49 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1514, 1516 (1963).
38. 51 Fed. Reserve Bull. 819 (1965).
39. 50 Fed. Reserve Bull. 711 (1964).
40. Commercial & Say. Bank, 51 Fed. Reserve Bull. 821, 822 (1965).
41. New York Banking Law § 601; see Comment, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 218 (1966).
42. "New York State's approach to [the public interest problem is) . .. that it is neces-
sary to determine whether the effect on competition is such as to be injurious to the public
interest. In other words, under New York's approach, if all other factors are equal, approval
would be granted unless it can be shown that the public will be harmed." Letter from G.
Russell Clark to Senator Javits, in 106 Cong. Rec. 9713-14 (1960).
43. 48 Fed. Reserve Bull. 14, 16 (1962).
44. Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) 1 71898, at 83154.
45. 80 Stat. 7 (1966), 12 U.S.CA. § 1828(c) (7) (A) (Supp. 1966). "Any action brought
under the antitrust laws arising out of a merger transaction shall be commenced [withln
30 days, or 10 days.in special circumstances, from agency approval] .... The commence-
ment of such an action shall stay the effectiveness of the agency's approval .... In any
such action, the court shall review de novo the issues presented." Ibid.
46. The instant court determined this a "legislative or administrative determination."
Ibid. (Footnote omitted.) See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
371 (1963); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952); Federal Radio Comm'n v.
General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 469 (1930) ; Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S.
428, 444 (1923).
47. In a true trial de novo, the court substitutes its judgment for that of the agency.
Southern Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'rs, 159 Tex. 227, 318 S.W.2d 619 (1958).
However, the instant court ruled that the convenience of the community determination
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to determine as a question of law "whether findings of fact by the agency are
supported by substantial evidence. " 48 The instant court will be able to do this
since there were some 1605 pages of testimony and exhibits.' 9 This problem
was also raised by United States v. First City Nat' Bank.50 There the court
placed the burden on the government to "prove an anticompetitive result
of the merger, and further that that is not outweighed by the convenience
and needs aspect of the matter."5' The Department of Justice is taking
outlined in the statute was nonjudicial in character. "Decisions that require the inquisitorial
type of procedure... which must ... be based upon a mosaic of expert opinion, judgment,
and decisions are and should be regarded as nonjudicial and left primarily to the ad-
ministrators." Finfrock, Trial De Novo-Panacea?, 14 Baylor L. Rev. 135, 160 (1962). The
substantial evidence rule has been instituted by the courts to review such decisions. The
courts may review the administrative ruling to determine if the action was supported by
substantial evidence at the hearing, Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tem. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424
(1946), but may not substitute its discretion for that of the agency in such nonjudicial
decisions.
48. Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) U 71898, at 83155.
49. Id. at 83150.
50. Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) Uf 71970 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1966), prob. juris.
noted, 87 Sup. Ct. 754 (1967).
51. Id. at 83434. Under the criteria of the 1966 act, it seems dear that the Comptroller
of the Currency would give approval of the Philadelphia National Bank merger were it
heard today. While the merged bank would have become the largest in the Philadelphia
area, controlling "36% of the area banks' total assets, 3675 of deposits, and 34o of net
loans," 374 U.S. at 331, the intent of the merger was to establish a bank which was
capable of offering Philadelphia corporations a scope of services commensurate with
those offered by the large New York banks, with which they were otherise forced to
deal. Id. at 333-34. This need of the business community in the Philadelphia area would
probably have been held sufficient to overcome any anticompetitive effects. This merger
was attacked in the courts for violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act and § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The United States Supreme Court determined that the Clayton Act violation was
enough to stop the merger without reaching the Sherman Act question. 374 U.S. at 323-24.
Under the new act it would seem that the Clayton Act could not be used for this purpose.
Further, a suit could not be brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act, which states that
"every ... combination ... in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal." 26 Stat.
209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). Although this test has been included in the
new statute, which clearly states that "(B) In any judicial proceeding attacking a merger
transaction approved under paragraph (5) on the ground that the merger transaction alone
and of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2 of the Act of
July 2, 1890 [section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 2], the standards applied
by the court shall be identical with those that the banking agencies are directed to apply
under paragraph (5)." 80 Stat. 7 (1966), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c)(7)(B) (Supp. 1966), it
is a factor which can be outweighed by the public interest. Thus, if the courts heard the
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case today the issue would be whether the Department of Justice
could prove that there were anticompetitive effects or a restraint of trade which was not
outweighed by the needs of the community. If the substantial evidence rule were invoked,
the agency ruling would carry great weight. See note 49 infra.
This contention is further supported by a recent case in which the Department of Justice
1967]
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this case to the Supreme Court, contending that once adverse effects on
competition can be shown, the burden should be on the banks to demonstrate
that the public interest outweighs the competitive effects. To do otherwise, ac-
cording to Donald F. Turner, the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice, would make the government's task "sig-
nificantly more difficult than Congress intended. 15 2 These contentions may be
valid as there would seem to be some degree of public interest in favor of
every proposed merger and since the public interest factor of the agency's de-
termination will be heard in light of the substantial evidence rule. Placing the
burden upon the banks to prove that there was substantial evidence for agency
approval would preserve the autonomy of the agency ruling yet provide a fairer
means of accomplishing court review. This system would have further merit in
that the agency with antitrust expertise would have the burden on the antitrust
issue, while a banking agency would have the burden on technical banking
matters.
Bankruptcy-Penalties for Trustee's Failure To File Returns for Taxes
Incurred by the Debtor in Possession Held Allowable Against the
Bankrupt Estate.-Beachcomber Motel, Inc., filed an original petition for an
arrangement with its unsecured creditors under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy
Act.' Operating the motel as a debtor in possession, the corporation withheld
income and social security taxes from its employees' wages and collected excise
taxes on the receipts from its cabaret. The arrangement subsequently failed and
an adjudication of bankruptcy was entered.2 A trustee in bankruptcy was
appointed, and, when the withheld and collected taxes later became due,8 he
neither paid the taxes nor filed returns for them. The United States filed claims
for the taxes, for interest thereon, and for penalties for failure to file. The
referee in bankruptcy allowed the claim for taxes, but disallowed the claims for
penalties and interest. 4 The district court affirmed.5 The Fifth Circuit reversed in
sought to enjoin the merger of the second and fourth largest banks in the Nashville area.
Although commercial banking in the area was extremely concentrated (the three largest
banks accounted for 93% of all deposits and loans), the court held that under the new
act a mere quantitative analysis is not sufficient to establish a violation of either the
Sherman or Clayton Acts. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 35 U.S.L. Week 2307 (M. Tenn.
Nov. 22, 1966).
52. Business Week, Jan. 28, 1967, p. 101, at 102.
1. Bankruptcy Act § 322, 52 Stat. 907 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1964).
2. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 680 (1966). See Brief for Petitioner on the
Merits, p. 23, Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966).
3. The income taxes, social security taxes and cabaret taxes were due to be paid on
October 31, 1958. On January 31, 1959, a payroll tax was due. 384 U.S. at 680.




part, allowing the claims for both penalties and interest in addition to the claim
for the principal of the taxes.6 The Supreme Court 7 disallowed the claim for
interest,8 but affirmed the allowance of penalties. Nicholas v. United States, 384
U.S. 678 (1966).
Boteler v. Ingels,2 held controlling in the instant case,'0 allowed penalties
against a trustee in bankruptcy for failure to pay license and registration fees
on vehicles which he operated in the process of liquidating a bankrupt business."
There the Court held inapplicable section 57(j) of the Bankruptcy Act,'-
which provides that "debts owing to the United States or to any State or any
subdivision thereof as a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed . . . .1 It
was reasoned that the wording of section 57(a) of the act"4 indicates that the
entirety of section 57 applies only to claims owing from the bankrupt to a
creditor.1 5 Since the penalties in issue were incurred by the trustee, they were
not owed by the bankrupt. Therefore, the Court found that the penalties in
question should be allowed'6 pursuant to the Act of June 18, 1934, which
provides that "any officers and agents conducting any business under authority
of a United States court shall be subject to all Federal, State and local taxes
applicable to such business to the same extent as if it were conducted by an
individual or corporation.' 7 The principle was thereby established that penal-
ties against a trustee for failure to pay taxes incurred while operating a bank-
rupt business were allowable against the bankrupt estate.' 8
6. United States v. Nicholas, 346 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1965).
7. Because of a contrary result reached in the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Kalish-
man, 346 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1965), the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 382 US. 971
(1966).
8. The Court discerned three periods in the life of this bankrupt estate-the time prior
to the filing of the petition for an arrangement, the abortive arrangement proceeding, and
the straight bankruptcy. The Court held that interest on a claim may only accumulate
during the period in which the claim arose. 384 U.S. at 685-86. Air. Justice Harlan dis-
agreed, arguing that the arrangement period should not be treated separately from the
subsequent bankruptcy period, and that, therefore, the interest should continue to ac-
cumulate after the termination of the arrangement. Id. at 696 (separate opinion).
9. 308 U.S. 57 (1939).
10. 384 U.S. at 693-95.
11. 308 U.S. at 60-61.
12. Id. at 60.
13. 30 Stat. 561 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1964).
14. 30 Stat. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1964). "A proof of claim shall
consist of a statement, in writing and signed by a creditor, setting forth the claim .. .and
that the claim is justly owing from the bankrupt to the creditor." Ibid.
15. 308 US. at 60.
16. Id. at 61.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1964).
18. A similar holding followed in In re Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 45 F. Supp. 77
(S.D. Cal. 1942). In a case involving liability for penalties for failure to pay sales taxes,
the court ruled that penalties on taxes that had accrued prior to bankruptcy were not
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The present case is, however, one of first impression. As the majority opinion
noted, the Boteler case is distinguishable from the instant case.1 9 In Boteler,
the Court found an obligation on the trustee to pay the license taxes on vehicles
employed in his own liquidating operations. Here the penalties were imposed
solely because of the trustee's failure to file returns for taxes incurred by the
debtor in possession during the Chapter XI arrangement period. The Court
felt, however, that this distinction, rather than dictating a different result than
in Boteler, gave an additional reason for allowing the penalty. Allowance in the
instant case did not involve the risk inherent in Boteler that a trustee would be
forced to choose between incurring a penalty or paying a tax and later finding
that there is not enough money in the estate to pay claims with higher priorities.2 0
Before reaching the question of whether the penalty was allowable, the Court
had to consider whether the penalty was validly assessed against the trustee.
The Court first reasoned that the trustee was liable for the taxes to the extent
of the priority granted under section 64(a) (1).21 This liability "results from
his succession in interest to the title of the debtor in possession, who, as an officer
of the bankruptcy court, was clearly subject to such taxes under the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 960 .... -22 Since the trustee was liable for the taxes, he was
required to file a return under section 6011(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,2a
and his failure to do so justified the imposition of penalties.
Mr. Justice White, with whom Justices Douglas and Fortas concurred, dis-
sented on the penalty issue.24 He found fault with the majority's reliance on
Boteler, arguing that there the trustee had incurred the obligation in his own
operation of the bankrupt business and not as a result of a debtor's prior opera-
tions.2 5 Here, he felt, the penalty should not have been assessed, since the
trustee's obligation to pay the taxes could become effective "only when and if
[the taxes] . . . are allowed and distribution is ordered." 20 Thus, he argued,
allowable under section 57(j), but that penalties on taxes that had accrued after bankruptcy
were allowable under the Boteler rule. Another case in which the Boteler decision was fol-
lowed was In re Chicago & N.W. Ry., 39 F. Supp. 147 (NJ). Ill.), afi'd, 119 F.2d 971 (7th
Cir. 1941), where state taxes were levied in 1935 and became a lien forthwith, but did not
become due until the following year. In the" interim, the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt.
After the taxes had become delinquent, during a trustee's term, the state sought allowance
of its claim for penalties for failure to pay the taxes. The court held that since the taxes
did not become due nor did the penalties begin to accumulate until after the adjudication
in bankruptcy, the trustee was liable for payment of the taxes and was, therefore, liable
for penalties for nonpayment thereof.
19. 384 U.S. at 694.
20. Id. at 694-95.
21. 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1) (1964).
22. 384 U.S. at 693 n.27.
23. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6011(a). This section provides that "any person made
liable for any tax . . . shall make a return "
24. 384 U.S. at 696 (separate opinion).
25. Id. at 701 (separate opinion).
26. Id. at 698 (separate opinion).
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there was no liability to pay the taxes as envisioned by section 6011(a) and the
trustee was neither bound to file the return, nor subject to a penalty for failure
to do so. 2 7 Mr. Justice White concluded that the majority's treatment of the
trustee as the same legal person as the debtor in possession had no legal basis,
because
the successor liability of the trustee who succeeds a debtor in possession is no different
from that of the trustee who succeeds the ordinary bankrupt, except that taxes accru-
ing during the arrangement are distinguished from prearrangement taxes in that they
are classified as administrative expenses and thus are escalated from a Class 4 to a
Class 1 priority, although relegated to an inferior position within Class I and hence
payable only if there are sufficient assets to pay prior expenses.28
The majority's rationale for treating the debtor in possession and the trustee
as the same legal person was essentially the same as the reasoning which makes
the trustee liable to pay claims which arise from debts incurred by the ordinary
bankrupt before bankruptcy.29 It is, however, well-established that the trustee
following an ordinary bankrupt "is not obligated to, indeed is not authorized
to, file the individual's return .... -30 If the mere liability to pay claims were
the type of liability envisioned by section 6011(a), as the majority held, "the
bankruptcy trustee in the ordinary proceeding not following an abortive Chap-
ter XI arrangement could not escape the rule [advanced by the majority] .... , 3
As the dissent noted, holding one person responsible for certain acts of another
is quite different from terming the two in all respects the same legal person.3-'
27. Id. at 698-99 (separate opinion).
28. Id. at 699 (separate opinion).
29. See 384 U.S. at 693 n.27. The majority relied on In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc.,
111 F2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940), where the debtor, in a reorganization proceeding, had been
permitted by the court to continue the operation of the business and to hire new employees
as a debtor in possession. The debtor then made a contract with a union providing that
each union member employed by the debtor was to receive a week's vacation with pay per
year of service. In an employee's suit against the subsequently appointed trustee for one
week's pay under the contract, the court held that the contract was an authorized act of
the debtor in possession and that the trustee was therefore liable under it for the em-
ployee's claim. See also In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1940), in which
the question arose as to whether subleases adopted under court authorization by the
debtor in possession bound the subsequently appointed trustee. In holding that the trustee
succeeded to both the rights and obligations of the debtor in possession under the sub-
lease, the court said, "with the court's approval an officer of the court had affirmed the
subleases; it is incredible that another officer subsequently appointed need reaffirm them
or has any power to disaffirm them, at least in the absence of some extraordinary cir-
cumstance." Id. at S6. "[Tihe receiver or trustee is bound in the absence of unusual drcum-
stances, by the authorized acts of the debtor in possession." 8 Collier, Bankruptcy Vl 6.32, at
965 (14th ed. 1966).




Mr. Justice White, assuming the validity of the penalties, also disagreed with
their allowance. The majority's holding was an apparent violation of the spirit
of the Court's prior holding in Simonson v. Granquist.33 There it.was said that
section 57(j) "is in keeping with the broad aim of the Act to provide for the
conservation of the estates of insolvents to the end that there may be as
equitable a distribution of assets as is consistent with the type of claims
involved.134 The Simonson decision also noted that it would be inequitable to
punish the bankrupt's creditors rather than the wrongdoer himself by the
allowance of penalties.35 Although the issue in the Simonson case was whether
a liened tax penalty incurred prior to bankruptcy was exempt from the prohibi-
tion of section 57(j), the Court's reasoning as to the purpose of that section
would be applicable here.
Most commentators agree with the interpretation of 57(j) which would dis-
allow penalties against bankrupt estates. "[T]he manifest purpose of the prohibi-
tive section [57(j)] is to protect the general creditors from diminution of their
shares . . . . 36 Hardship to creditors, such as attorneys and employees, in no-
asset cases has been cited as another evil resulting from an overly generous allot-
ment to the government 37 inasmuch as "the creditor has contributed to the bank-
rupt's estate prior to bankruptcy, which is the basis for his claim, while the
government is seeking to recover a mere fine or type of punishment assessed
against the bankrupt." 38
The present holding, failing to follow the "general policy against allowing
penalties against bankrupt estates"3 9 could be justified "if the filing of the
return by the trustee performed some critical function . . . ." 0 The govern-
ment, however, will collect its taxes regardless of the filing of the return since
notice must be given to the Internal Revenue Service of the first creditors'
33. 369 U.S. 38 (1962).
34. Id. at 40.
35. "Enforcement of penalties against the estates of bankrupts, however, would serve
not to punish the delinquent taxpayers, but rather their entirely innocent creditors." Id. at
41. "It is this consideration for the bankrupt's creditors that pervades § 57j." 3 Collier,
Bankruptcy I9 57.22, at 346 (14th ed. 1966).
36. 40 B.U.L. Rev. 13'1, 136 (1960). The author discussed "the resultant inequities to
the sharing creditors if the contested penalty claims were allowed." Ibid.; see H.R. Rep.
No. 745, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959), where it is said that, "since the purpose of a
penalty is to punish the wrongdoer, that purpose is in no way furthered by permitting a
penalty assessed against the bankrupt to be allowed against the bankrupt's estate." Id. at
20. See also Comment, Post-Petition Interest on Tax Claims, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 504
(1966).
37. See Note, 35 Ind. L.J. 351, 359 (1960).
38. 38 Texas L. Rev. 800, 803 (1960). The author concluded that "the allowance of a
penalty seems grossly inequitable and against the underlying theory of the Bankruptcy
Act, which is equal distribution of the bankrupt's assets . " Id. at 801.
39. 384 U.S. at 699 (separate opinion).
40. Ibid.
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meeting, and the government would, therefore, have ample opportunity to
file a claim.41 Moreover, it will be difficult for a trustee to determine whether
tax returns must be filed, and, if the date for filing is soon after the trustee's
appointment, it might be difficult for him to gather the proper information and
file.42
The majority itself, in that part of the opinion disallowing the government's
claim for interest, sanctioned equitable principles which it ignored in its allowance
of penalties. These principles are based on "historical considerations of equity
and administrative convenience. .... "43 "Equity" protects the general creditors
from constantly diminishing shares in the bankrupt estate due to the accumula-
tion of interest on the government's claim and the delay in the settlement of the
estate caused by operation of law. "Administrative convenience" refers to the
burden spared the trustee of constantly recalculating the various claims as the
unpaid interest continually increases. The penalty for failure to file in the
instant case was five per cent of the tax per month until the filing of the return,
but it could not exceed twenty-five per cent of the tax.44 A penalty is usually
a lump sum, and, therefore, problems of continuous shrinking of the creditors'
portion of the estate are not usually involved. The distinction is tenuous at best
where the penalty will increase monthly for five months, each month reducing
the shares of the other creditors and forcing the trustee to recalculate the
amount of all the claims. In some instances, a penalty can be even more like
interest.45 For these reasons, disallowance of the penalty would seem to have
been the only course open to the instant Court.
Estate Tax-Marital Deduction Disallowed on Surviving Spouse's Interest
in a Trust As Not Constituting a Specific Portion of the Estate.-Plaintiff
was the executor and trustee of the estate of the decedent, who had left a will
which set up a trust. According to the terms of the will, the decedent's spouse
was to receive 300.00 per month out of the income and principal of the trust
until their youngest child reached 18 years of age, at which time the payments
were to be increased to 350.00 per month. Furthermore, the spouse was given
a testamentary power of appointment over the remainder. The Commissioner
41. Id. at 700 (separate opinion).
42. Ibid.; see Bankruptcy Act § 58(e), 52 Stat. 868 (1938), as amended, II U.S.C. §
94(e) (1964). The maximum extension granted for filing such returns is 1S days. Mim. 6157,
1947-2 Cum. Bull. 64, 66.
43. 384 U.S. at 682.
44. Id. at 680 n.5.
45. For example, in the case of In re Chicago & N.W. Ry., 39 F. Supp. 147 (N.).
Ill.), aff'd, 119 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1941), the penalty was one per cent of the unpaid tax
per month until paid, thus accruing in the same manner and for the same length of time
as interest. In all respects, therefore, this penalty accrued as interest, with the single ex-
ception that it was more burdensome.
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disallowed a marital deduction as to any portion of the trust on the grounds that
it did not meet statutory requirements.1 The district court,2 rejecting the gov-
ernment's arguments in part," allowed a deduction for a part of the corpus of
the trust.4 The court of appeals reversed. Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 509
(1966).
The marital deduction, as embodied in section 2056 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, is an attempt to equalize the rights of surviving spouses in com-
munity property and common law states.5 This aim is accomplished by allowing
1. The government's argument was that the estate "does not qualify for the marital
deduction because the surviving spouse is not entitled to all of the income from the entire
interest . . . ." Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp.
941, 942 (M.D. Pa. 1964). (Footnote omitted.) The government here referred to Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (5), "life estate with power of appointment in surviving spouse.-
In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is
entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific
portion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, with power in the surviving
spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion (exercisable in favor of such
surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or
not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with no power in any other
person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than
the surviving spouse .... "
The government's second argument was that the estate also "cannot fit within the defini-
tion of a specific portion because . .. the surviving spouse's rights in income must be a
fractional or percentile share and not a fixed amount . . . ." Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States, supra. Here the government relied on Treas. Reg. § 20.2056
(b)-5(c) (1958): "Definition of 'specific portion'. A partial interest in property Is not
treated as a specific portion of the entire interest unless the rights of the surviving spouse
in income and as to the power constitute a fractional or percentile share of a property
interest so that such interest or share in the surviving spouse reflects its proportionate
share of the increment or decline in the whole of the property interest to which the In-
come rights and the power relate. Thus, if the right of the spouse to income and the
power extent [sic] to one-half or a specified percentage of the property, or the equivalent,
the interest is considered as a specific portion. On the other hand, if the annual income of
the spouse is limited to a specific sum, ... the interest is not a deductible interest."
2. Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 941 (M.D.
Pa. 1964).
3. The court accepted the government's first argument, id. at 944-45, but rejected the
second argument, id. at 945-46. See note 1 supra.
4. Id. at 947.
5. Mr. Justice Goldberg, in discussing the legislative intent behind the marital deduc-
tion, observed that "under a community property system, such as that in Texas, the
spouse receives outright ownership of one-half of the community property and only the
other one-half is included in the decedent's estate. To equalize the incidence of progressively
scaled estate taxes and to adhere to the patterns of state law, the marital deduction
permits a deceased spouse . . . to transfer free of taxes one-half of the non-community
property to the surviving spouse. . . . [T~he primary thrust of this is to extend to tax-
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up to a maximum of fifty per cent of the adjusted gross of the decedent's estate
passing to the surviving spouse to qualify for a marital deduction.0 The effect
is to defer taxation of some part of the decedent's estate passing to the sur-
viving spouse until the death of the survivor. To insure that estates would not
escape ultimate taxation, the terminable interest rule was created.- This restric-
tion on the marital deduction disqualifies a trust if the interest of the surviving
spouse will fail on lapse of time or some other contingency." This rule, however,
resulted in preventing certain traditional methods of estate planning from quali-
fying for the marital deduction,9 and so three exceptions to the terminable inter-
est rule were made,' 0 one of which was the life estate with an appropriate power
of appointment." Thus, where the surviving spouse is entitled to all the income
produced from the corpus of a trust for the remainder of the survivor's life, with
power in the survivor to appoint the entire corpus, the entire corpus of the trust
qualifies for a marital deduction. Whereas previously only an entire trust could
qualify for a deduction,' 2 it later developed that a "specific portion" of the
trust could qualify if that portion met the requirements.
Since the spouse in the present case was not necessarily entitled to all the
income of the trust, it was clear that the entire trust did not qualify for a
marital deduction. 13 The court was therefore faced with the question of whether
a specific portion of the trust qualified.' 4
In Gelb v. Commissioner,'5 the surviving spouse was entitled to all the in-
come from the trust estate, but the trustees had discretionary power to invade
the corpus for up to $5,000.00 per year for the support of the decedent's daugh-
payers in common-law States the advantages of 'estate splitting' otherwise available only
in community property States." United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963). Accord,
Dougherty v. United States, 292 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. Estate of
Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958). See generally Anderson, The Marital Deduction and
Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Com-
munity Property States, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1087 (1956); Polasky, Marital Deduction in
Estate Taxation, 12 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (1957); Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1176 (1959).
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c)(1).
7. United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 n.13; see Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1176,
1177 (1959).
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(1). See generally Edwards, Marital Deduction
Pitfalls--Methods of Losing the Marital Deduction, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 247 (1965).
9. See Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1176, 1178-79 (1959).
10. The three exceptions are interests conditioned on the widow's survi-al for a limited
period, life estates with powers of appointment, and life insurance or annuity contracts.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (3), (5), (6); see Note, 16 INT. Res. L. Rev. 190, 194-95
(1964).
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e)(1)(F), added by ch. 168, 62 Stat. 118 (1948);
Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 549 (2d Cir. 1962).
13. 363 F.2d at 480-81.
14. Id. at 481.
15. 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
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ter.16 The Commissioner argued that a treasury regulation required that a
specific portion must be a fraction or percentage in order to reflect any increment
or decline in the value of the property,1 because otherwise, "'there is no cer-
tainty that the value' of the entire corpus 'will be the same on the date of the
surviving spouse's death as it was on the date of decedent's death,' .... ,,18 Fur-
thermore, the Commissioner contended that the legislative reports mentioned a
fraction as an example of a specific portion.19 Rejecting the Commissioner's ar-
guments, the court, through Judge Friendly, pointed out that "Congress spoke of
a 'specific portion,' not of a 'fractional or percentile share,' . . .,,2o and gave
no indication that a change in the surviving spouse's share should be a con-
trolling factor. 21 The court, after holding that use of a fraction as an example
does not constitute an exclusive expression on the subject, proceeded to com-
pute actuarily the portion of the trust entitled to a deduction. Thus, the court
multiplied the $5,000.00 stipend by the mother's and daughter's joint life
expectancies to establish the maximum portion to which the surviving spouse
reasonably would not be entitled. This amount was then subtracted from the
whole to arrive at the "specific portion" which would qualify for a marital
deduction. It was admitted that this method was at least somewhat inaccurate."2
But Judge Friendly answered this possible objection by pointing to the wide-
spread use of actuarial tables in estate tax problems.2 3
The plaintiff in the instant case relied heavily on Gelb. The district court, in
granting judgment for the plaintiff, agreed that Gelb was controlling,24 and, using
an actuarial method,25 arrived at the sum necessary to produce an income of
$300.00 per month for the surviving spouse's life. The instant court, in rejecting
16. Id. at 546 n.1.
17. He relied on Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958). See note 1 supra.
18. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1962), quoting from Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
19. 298 F.2d at 549. The example relied upon is, "if the decedent in his will provided
for the creation of a trust under the terms of which the income from one-half of the
trust property is payable to this surviving spouse with uncontrolled power in the spouse
to appoint such one-half of the trust property by will, such interest will qualify as an
exception from the terminable interest rule." H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
319 (1954).
20. 298 F.2d at 550-51.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 551.
23. Id. at 551-52. The court documented the use of actuarial tables. Id. at 551 n.7.
24. Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 941, 946
(M.D. Pa. 1964).
25. Id. at 947. The formula is based on United States Life Table 38 and can be found
in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958). Simply stated, 3!/2%, the assumed interest yield, is
multiplied by the present value of a right to receive $300.00 per month for the life ex-
pectancy of a 42-year-old surviving spouse. Therefore, the formula utilized was $300.00 X
12 X( 17.3911 (the factor for the discount rate of 3!2% for surviving spouse's life ex-
pectancy) X 1.0159 (the factor for monthly payments).
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the actuarial method, raised the objection mentioned in Gelb, that it "does not
. .. isolate that part of the trust corpus from which the surviving spouse is
entitled to all the income."' 2 6 The majority advanced four arguments to support
its position. Initially, the court recognized the actuarial method as appropriate
for annuities and by this fact inappropriate for determining a specific portion,
since, under this method, the entire fund will have been dissipated at the sur-
vivor's death, and the factor of fund dissolution was in no way contemplated by
the decedent. 27 Secondly, the court pointed to the incongruity of equating the
$300.00 monthly stipend with the income yield. Under the trust agreement, the
trustees had not been directed to invest the corpus so that it would yield a
given monthly income. Since the trustees were only directed to pay the monthly
stipend even if corpus had to be invaded, the stipend and income yield were
hardly equivalent.28 Thirdly, by definition, any computation of a specific
portion must proceed from the value of the entire trust, rather than a capitaliza-
tion of the monthly stipend, since capitalizing a monthly stipend under the
actuarial method for determining a specific portion could reach a figure in
excess of the value of the entire corpus.29 Finally, the court indicated that the
use of any variable factors other than life expectancy artificially inflates the
portion by making constant factors which are variable.30
judge Forman, for the instant court, distinguished Gdb on the basis that
there was only one variable-life expectancy 3 1-in that case in comparison
with the many variables here-life expectancy, market conditions for investment
purposes,32 and the extent to which the corpus might be invaded. As a result
26. 363 F2d at 481.
27. Id. at 481-82. The factor 17.3911 in the formula represents the present worth of one
dollar invested in an annuity at 3Y2% over the remaining life expectancy of the surviving
spouse. The formula thus provides a discount value through a process of capitalizing at
3312'l what are directed to be $300.00 monthly payments. If $63,663.43 is invested at age
forty-two, the age of the surviving spouse at the decedent's death, that amount will provide
the annuitant the required monthly payments for her entire life. But at death the entire
fund will have dissipated. Ibid.
Although it did not affect its holding, the court mischaracterized the factor 17.3911 as
the present worth of an investment of $1.00 over the remaining life expectancy. This
factor actually represents the present worth of the total annuity fund which will yield an
annuity of $1.00. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f), Table 1 (1958).
28. 363 F.2d at 482.
29. Ibid. Capitalizing a $350.00 monthly stipend, the capital figure reached is $74,199.80,
a sum in excess of the value of the entire corpus. Ibid.
30. Ibid. Further, "the 33/2 percent investment factor ...is ...unreal." Ibid.
31. Id. at 483. Indicating that Gelb could be distinguished, it was pointed out that
there was no question in Gelb as to how much the corpus could be invaded, as $5,000.00 per
year represented a maximum. Ibid. The court had already stated that the only acceptable
variable was life expectancy. Ibid.
32. The majority pointed out that if the market conditions are poor, a greater amount
must be taken from the corpus, while if they are good, the income must be accumulated.
In either case there is no certainty. Id. at 484.
33. Whereas the trust in Gelb empowered the trustees to invade the corpus to the
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of these variable factors, "the ratio between the maximum monthly income and
the monthly stipend-the fraction of the entire corpus which would be the
'specific portion' for marital deduction purposes-may not be acceptably com-
puted." 4
In Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States,5 the Seventh Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion on almost identical facts. Following Gelb, the majority
rejected the Treasury Regulation in so far as it limited "specific portion" to a
fractional share.8 6 In considering the problem presented as to the variables and
the use of actuarial tables, the court cited with approval the decision of the
district court in the instant case.37
Although the instant court refused to consider the validity of the Treasury
Regulation, it apparently agreed with Gelb as to the facts of that case.88 Thus,
the decision appears to support the proposition that a specific portion need
not be a fractional share as long as the amount of the portion can be computed
with reasonable accuracy. While the court here was not satisfied with the
maximum extent of $5,000.00 per year for the support and education of the decedent's
daughter, the trust in the present case authorized the trustees to pay an amount not ex-
ceeding $1,500.00 in the event of a serious illness or financial emergency. In Gelb, the lump
sum amount to be invaded per year could be maximized. But here it would be Impossible
to determine the amount to be drawn in case of illness or emergencies. Thus, any formula
predicated on such factors as constants must fail. Ibid.
In dissent, Judge Ganey wrote: "I do not take into consideration fluctuation, wide or
narrow, of the value of the corpus or the income thereon, over what would be the
life expectancy of the wife, since the marital deduction is taken only once, at the death
of testator, and I determine then what would be its value and not what might ultimately
happen." Id. at 487; cf. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964). Agreeing with
the lower court, Judge Ganey saw no reason why "the field [should] lie fallow and two
should] adopt a sterile attitude of defeatism because the testator has not resorted to frac-
tional or percentile figures." 363 F.2d at 488. judge Ganey also rejected the majority's
argument that Congress intended to extend the marital deduction only to those Interests
akin to a fee simple, id. at 482-83, saying that this did not bear on the issue since such
reasoning would also disqualify this estate even if expressed in fractional terms, id. at 488.
The majority gave as a further reason for denying the deduction the fact that the will
qualified the monthly stipend by making it unassignable and not subject to the surviving
spouse's debts. Id. at 485. The court had already concluded that the surviving spouse's
interest did not conform to the intended fee simple because it was not subject to the "rise
and fall of the market." Id. at 482.
34. Id. at 484. (Footnote omitted.) A similar result was reached in Flesher v. United
States, 238 F. Supp. 119 (N.D.W. Va. 1965).
35. 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. Week 3108 (U.S. Aug. 26,
1966) (No. 488). The surviving spouse was entitled to an income of $200.00 per month even
if the corpus had to be invaded. The trustee was empowered to pay, inter alia, all costs and
taxes out of the corpus. The same formula as found in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958), which
was used in the district court in the instant case, was employed.
36. 359 F.2d at 821.
37. Ibid.
38. 363 F.2d at 483-84.
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method used by the lower court, it did indicate that an acceptable method might
be found "if the investment factors involved were constant and it could be
determined that the maximum income that could be produced from the corpus
in a month was, for example, $500 then the relationship between the $300
monthly stipend and the $500 maximum income would define 'specific portion'
for marital deduction purposes .... 39
The dissent in the instant case and the majority in Citizens Nat'l Bank argued,
however, that the use of the actuarial formula, although not absolutely accurate,
is reasonably accurate and within the legislative intent, and therefore should
be employed in determining the amount of the marital deduction.40
While it is true that the variables in the instant case were such that any
determination of a specific portion might in fact be grossly inaccurate, it seems
harsh to deny the estate any deduction when it is clear that some portion of the
trust will meet the requirements for the deduction. The government should have
some legitimate interest involved before such a result is reached, and it would
seem that here it does not. As judge Friendly pointed out in Gelb, "the United
States is in business with enough different taxpayers so that the law of averages
has ample opportunity to work." 4' This being true, should the government
complain of the possibility of error in any single case?
Res Judicata-Successful Action by Passenger of One Automobile Against
Driver of Another Bars Second Driver from Recovering Against First
Driver in Subsequent Suit.-An automobile owned by the Standard Electric
Corporation and driven by Bernard Dresher collided with an automobile owned
by Martin Cummings and driven by his wife Mary. Henry Dresher, Bernard's
brother, was accompanying him at the time of the accident. The Dreshers
brought separate suits against the Cummingses. These actions were tried jointly
in the United States district court for the Southern District of New York. The
jury decided in favor of passenger Henry, but the Cummingses were absolved
of any liability to driver Bernard.' In announcing the latter verdict, the jury
stated that it found Mary Cummings to be negligent, but denied recovery
since it found Bernard Dresher contributorily negligent. The Cummingses then
39. Id. at 484 n.17. (Emphasis omitted.)
40. Id. at 487-88. The dissent reasoned that "since the surviving spouse is absolutely
entitled to . .. $300.00 per month, and if this amount is construed to represent income
from corpus, then the amount of the corpus which would yield this income could be as-
certained and regarded as qualifying as a 'specific portion' for the marital deduction." Id.
at 487. The use of the actuarial formula employed by the district court was found not to
"strain the statutory intent nor ... work a change in the phrase 'specific portion', and
is fully in accord with the mandate of the statute .... " Id. at 487-88.
41. 298 F.2d at 552.
1. Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 110, 218 N.E.2d 688, 691, 271 N.YS.2d 976,
979 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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instituted the present suit against Bernard Dresher and Standard Electric in the
New York supreme court. The defendants argued that since Mary Cummings'
freedom from contributory negligence was a necessary requisite to the Cum-
mingses' success in their action, and, since that precise issue had been conclu-
sively determined against them in the previous litigation, the complaint should be
summarily dismissed on the ground that the prior litigation was an effective
bar to any redress the plaintiffs might claim. The trial court and the appellate
division denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, but the court
of appeals, with two judges concurring and another dissenting,2 reversed and
held that the previous adjudications were res judicata. Cummings v. Dresher,
18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
The underlying purpose of the common law doctrine of res judicata is to
further the fundamental interest of the state that there "should be an end to
litigation. ' 4 Its thrust is to cut off all unwarranted and unnecessary legal
actions; its justification is that a party should be entitled to his day in court, but
only once on any one cause of action.5 However, the desire to prevent unnecessary
litigation should not be realized at the cost of denying a party the opportunity to
have the validity of his claim decided by a court of law.6 To this end, res judicata
and its companion doctrine, collateral estoppel,7 have been traditionally circum-
2. Judge Bergan dissented. Judges Fuld and Van Voorhis concurred in a separate opinion
which held the federal compulsory counterclaim rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), to be controlling.
The majority and dissent considered the rule to be immaterial since it had been raised
neither in the lower courts nor before the instant bench. 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 113, 218
N.E.2d 688, 690, 693, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978, 982 (1966).
3. A final judgment "rendered upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction Is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other actions on the points
in issue and adjudicated in the first suit." Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery,
275 N.Y. 14, 17, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937); see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg
Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929).
4. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 118, 134 N.E.2d 97, 98, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1,
3 (1956).
5. Id. at 119, 134 N.E.2d at 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
6. "Judicial finality . . . is a salutary doctrine only when it precludes unnecessary
litigation without eliminating a litigant's day in court . . . ." Moore & Currier, Mutuality
and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 Tul. L. Rev. 301, 302 (1961); accord, Commissioners
of State Ins. Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 595, 148 N.E.2d 136, 138, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798
(1958).
7. Res judicata should be distinguished from collateral estoppel. The former applies
when the same cause of action is sued upon. There the judgment is binding not only as
to facts actually determined, but also as to those which might have been decided.
Collateral estoppel operates when the causes of action are different; then the estoppel
works only as to those matters actually litigated. For a more detailed treatment of the differ-
ence between these two doctrines see Friedman v. Park Lane Motors, Inc., 18 App. Div.
2d 262, 265-66, 238 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976-77 (1st Dep't 1963); 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller,
New York Civil Practice fI 5011.24 (1966 ed.). New York courts, including the instant one,
tend to treat the two as indistinguishable. See 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1158, 1159-60 & n.10 (1961).
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scribed by the requirements of privity of parties,8 mutuality of estoppel," and
identity of issues.'0
Since Henry Dresher, in his suit against the Cummingses, recovered damages
resulting from his personal injuries, that action unquestionably barred the Cum-
mingses from ever again contesting with Henry the issue of their liability to him.
The court of appeals, however, decided that the Cummingses were also precluded
from contesting the issue of their liability to Bernard. The court must have
reasoned from either of two premises. The first would be that since Henry
Dresher's successful prosecution determined that Mary Cummings' negligence
was the cause of the collision, the Cummingses were precluded from raising this
The present note will generally use the term res judicata in discussing what actually is a
collateral estoppel problem, since the instant court talks in terms of res judicata and the
distinction would be of no practical importance here.
8. Privity limits the number of litigants against whom the judgment can be asserted.
See Haverhill v. International Ry., 217 App. Div. 521, 522, 217 N.Y. Supp. 522, 523 (4th
Dep't 1926), aff'd mem., 244 N.Y. 582, 155 N.E. 905 (1927); 1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 523
(16th ed. 1899); Restatement, Judgments § 83 (1942); cf. Romeo v. Western Express
Co., 45 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
9. Mutuality defines those who may plead the prior adjudication. "'[Olne of the essentials
of an estoppel by judgment or res judicata is that both the litigants must be concluded by the
judgment or it binds neither."' Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 128, 172
Adt. 260, 261 (Super. Ct. 1934). (Italics omitted.) See Haverhill v. International Ry., 217
App. Div. 521, 525-26, 217 N.Y. Supp. 522, 527 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd mem., 244 N.Y. 582,
155 N.E. 905 (1927).
Privity of parties and mutuality of estoppel are two sides of the same coin and frequently
can be treated as conceptually identical. A sounder approach, however, would be to
regard privity as the tie that must bind the one against whom the former judgment is
asserted, while mutuality is the requirement that must be fulfilled by the party seeking
to take advantage of the prior adjudication. Thus, "the highly important function of limiting
the persons who may invoke the conclusive effect of a judgment is left entirely to the
doctrine of mutuality." Moore & Currier, supra note 6, at 330. (Emphasis omitted.) See
36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1158, 1162 (1961).
10. See Restatement, Judgments § 68 (1942). The tendency today is to disregard some-
what the traditional res judicata requirements and instead pay more heed to the prac-
ticalities of each situation. E.g., Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir.
1965); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 15I N.YS.2d 1
(1956); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937);
Friedman v. Park Lane Motors, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 262, 267-68, 238 N.Y.S.2d 973, 978-79
(1st Dep't 1963) (dissenting opinion).
One commentator summed up the contemporary judicial notion of privity thusly: "[T]he
term 'privity' in itself does not state a reason for either including or excluding a person
from the binding effect of a prior judgment, but rather it represents a legal conclusion that
the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and the non-party is suffi-
dently dose to afford application of the principle of [res judicataJ .. . ." Vestal, Preclusion-
Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 27, 45 (1964). See also Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 861-62 (1952).
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question in a subsequent action against Bernard."1 The alternative premise
would be that the unnecessary explanation by the jury, that they bad decided
that both drivers were negligent, was a binding determination of Mary Cum-
mings' negligence.
Implicit in the first premise is the assumption that, if Mary Cummings were
negligent towards passenger Henry, she must also have been negligent towards
his driver Bernard. This assumption is, however, contrary to existing New York
law. In Daly v. Terpening,'2 the court observed that "the positions of the driver
and the passenger in the automobile are different .... "13 Thus what "would be
causative negligence of [one driver] ... in so far as the passenger was concerned,
may not be causative negligence as far as the [other] driver . . . was concerned
.... "14 The Daly decision went no further than this general principle. How-
ever, the supreme court of appeals of Virginia, in Ferebee v. Hungate,'5 con-
sidered this issue in more detail and observed that "the question of the last clear
chance may be a pertinent issue between the two drivers, whereas it was of no
concern to the [passenger] ... ."16 Mary's negligence, therefore, might have
been a proximate cause of the collision as to Henry Dresher, but Bernard Dresher
11. The majority opinion borrowed some sweeping language on this point from Israel v.
Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 NZ..2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956), which was regarded
as the breakthrough decision in New York in the struggle to end the harshness of the mu-
tuality rule. The case received immediate notice: 23 Brooklyn L. Rev. 149 (1957) ; 42 Cor-
nell L.Q. 290 (1957) ; 35 Texas L. Rev. 137 (1956). Justice Clark of the Second Circuit, how-
ever, had reviewed New York law on the subject more than ten years earlier and had
concluded: "It seems to me reasonably clear that New York is committed to applying the
exception [to mutuality] along broad lines to accord the defensive protection of estoppel of
a former judgment to those whose liability must be founded, if at all, upon just the same
issue as has been previously litigated." Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 993 (2d Cir. 1945)
(dissenting opinion).
12. 261 App. Div. 423, 26 N.Y.S.2d 160 (4th Dep't) aff'd mem., 287 N.Y. 611, 39 N.E.2d
260 (1941). Terpening had instituted two actions against driver Mrs. Daly for damages
arising out of a collision between the latter's and Terpening's vehicles. The first was for
wrongful death of Terpening's spouse, a passenger in his auto who died of the Injuries
sustained therein. The second Terpening brought on his own behalf. Following a joint
trial, a judgment was rendered for Terpening in the death action, but against him in the
other. When Mrs. Daly later sued Terpening for her damages, he set up the defense of
res judicata, claiming that the plaintiff's negligence had been conclusively settled. The
appellate court denied his contention.
13. Id. at 426, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
14. Id. at 427, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 164. Accord, Clark v. Naufel, 328 Mich. 249, 43
N.W.2d 839 (1950); Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 148 N.E.2d
136, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1958); Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159,
184 N.E. 744 (1933) (by implication); cf. Hassenplug v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 71 F.
Supp. 70 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd mem., 163 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1947); Grijalva v. Elkins, 132 Colo.
315, 287 P.2d 970 (1955); Ordway v. White, 25 Misc. 2d 633, 204 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct.
1960), aff'd mem., 14 App. Div. 2d 498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 334 (4th Dep't 1961).
15. 192 Va. 32, 63 S.E.2d 761 (1951).
16. Id. at 40, 63 S.E.2d at 767.
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might have been in a position to avoid the accident in the final moments. New
York recognizes the last clear chance doctrine, and a party can recover, even
though he would otherwise have been held negligent, if he can establish the
requisites for applying the doctrine. 17 Therefore, the jury's decision allowing
Henry to recover damages might be completely irrevelant in a later action
brought by the Cummingses against Bernard. I8
The second premise from which the instant court might have deduced its
holding presents the issue of whether the court could have properly relied upon
the gratuitous findings of the federal jury. Under prior New York law,10 determi-
nations by the trier of fact became adjudicated only when they formed the basis
of the verdict 20 Where only a general verdict had been called for,2 ' any addi-
tional and immaterial conclusions that the jury volunteered were not binding in
subsequent actions.22 This was so even if the jury's statements related to issues
raised by the pleadingss3 or if their observations later appeared in the court's
17. See, e.g., Kumkumian v. City of New York, 305 N.Y. 167, 111 N.E.2d 865 (1953);
Chadwick v. City of New York, 301 N.Y. 176, 93 N.E.2d 625 (1950); Elliott v. New York
Rapid Transit Corp., 293 N.Y. 145, 56 N.E.2d 86 (1944); Hernandez v. Brooklyn &
Queens Transit Corp., 284 N.Y. 535, 32 N.E.2d 542 (1940). See also 41 N.Y. Jur. Negligence
§§ 70-75 (1965) and authorities cited therein.
18. A similar situation involves the right of one tortfeasor to litigate issues of negligence
with another tortfeasor after a third party has recovered in a negligence action against both
of them. Minkoff v. Brenner, 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E.2d 434, 225 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1962)
(memorandum decision), held that res judicata was inappropriate in this situation and
appeared to affirm the earlier case of Glaser v. Huette, 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.
Supp. 374 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931). The Minkoff
court did not write an opinion, but one commentator has aptly suggested that the
rationale employed involved the recognition that while the co-defendants had litigated the
question of their negligence towards the plaintiff, their conduct toward one another was
still in issue. 30 Fordham L. Rev. 820, 822-23 (1962).
19. Purpora v. Coney Island Dairy Prods. Corp., 262 App. Div. 908, 28 N.Y.S.2d 1008
(2d Dep't 1941), is markedly similar to the instant case. In the initial action the jury
stated that both sides were at fault in an auto accident. The defendant, the plaintiff in the
first suit, asserted that this previous determination barred the plaintiff in the later suit from
recovering, but the court discounted this contention and ruled that the special and gratuitous
verdict was unwarranted and not binding.
20. Cambria v. Jeffery, 307 Mass. 49, 29 N.E.2d 555 (1940); House v. Lockwood, 137
N.Y. 259, 33 N.E. 595 (1893); Raga v. S.S. Kresge Co., 274 App. Div. 966, 84 N.Y.S2d
776 (4th Dep't 1948) (memorandum opinion).
21. "[lit is clear from the record that the Judge [in the district court] vas requiring
the jury to return a general verdict . . . ." Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 113, 218
N.E.2d 688, 693, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 982 (1966) (Bergan, J., dissenting).
22. Purpora v. Coney Island Dairy Prods. Corp., 262 App. Div. 908, 28 N.Y.S.2d 1008
(2d Dep't 1941) ; Carrig v. Oakes, 173 Misc. 793, 20 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. CL), aff'd mern, 260
App. Div. 989, 24 N.Y.S.2d 135 (4th Dep't 1940); Hollywood Cartage Co. v. Wheeling &
Lake Erie Ry., 85 Ohio App. 182, 88 N.E.2d 278 (1948).
23. Karameros v. Luther, 279 N.Y. 87, 17 N.E.2d 779 (1938).
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official reports. 24 Since the federal jury could have denied recovery to Bernard
by simply finding that he alone was negligent, 25 the gratuitous statement that
Mary was also negligent would not have been binding in the present action under
prior New York law.
Unfortunately, the majority's opinion is not entirely clear and the possibility
that Henry's adjudication was the deciding factor cannot be completely dis-
counted. However, since the majority largely ignored the question of Henry's
adjudication, 20 and discussed only the "definite and unmistakeable Federal court
jury finding as to both drivers being at fault," 27 it probably intended simply to
overrule the well-established doctrine that gratuitous holdings have no validity.
There is, indeed, good reason to reconsider and perhaps modify the legal effect
given to gratuitous jury findings. In a situation such as the one presented by the
instant case, where a party has an opportunity to, and does in fact, fully litigate
a particular issue,28 any determination of fact by the jury which is relevant to
the litigated issue should be considered an adjudication to which the res judicata
doctrine could apply. On the other hand, the doctrine should not extend to
instances where the volunteered statement bears no relevance to the dispute.20
There may be some difficulty in applying such a test. For example, in Kara-
meros v. Luther,30 a husband sued his wife to have their marriage declared void.
She asserted that in a previous action in which she applied for a separation, the
defendant pleaded the affirmative defense of no marriage, but withdrew the
defense upon trial.3' The court denied her the separation and found that a valid
24. McLoughlin v. Arlon Motors, Inc., 43 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
25. Restatement, Judgments § 68, illustration 10 (1942), gives this example: "A and
B, while operating automobiles, have a collision. A brings an action against B, alleging
that the collision was caused by the negligence of B. B denies that he was negligent and
alleges that the collision was due to A's negligence. The trial court, sitting without ajury, finds that the collision was caused by the negligence of both A and B, and gives judg-
ment for B. Thereafter B brings an action against A to recover the damage to his person and
automobile resulting from the collision. B is not precluded from maintaining this action
by the finding in the prior action that B was guilty of negligence and by the judgment In
that action, since the judgment was based upon the negligence of A, and the finding that
B was negligent was not material to the judgment."
26. 18 N.Y.2d at 106-08, 218 N.E.2d at 689-91, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 976-78.
27. Id. at 107, 218 N.E.2d at 689, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 977. Counsel for the plaintiff dis-
cussed the Daly case, but made no explicit reference to the last clear chance doctrine. Brief
for Plaintiff, pp. 12-14, Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d
976 (1966).
28. It might be argued that all Mary wished to show in the first action was that
Bernard was negligent. This proven and his suit dismissed, she would then sue him In the
state court. However, this seems unlikely. Mary could not know with certainty that
Bernard would be found negligent and therefore would certainly wish to defend herself fully.
29. E.g., Karameros v. Luther, 279 N.Y. 87, 17 N.E.2d 779 (1938).
30. 279 N.Y. 87, 17 N.E.2d 779 (1938).




union existed. The New York court of appeals, in the second action, held that the
finding of a valid marriage was not res judicata. The instant case perhaps over-
ruled Karameros. But a question of fairness to the husband is raised; obviously
he wished to litigate the marriage's validity at a later date. Should he be penal-
ized for his decision? The extent of the evidence on the marriage presented in the
first suit perhaps should be considered. The instant case offers no solution to this
problem, and, unfortunately, resolution must lie with later courts.
Securities Regulation--Complaint Seeking Recovery Under Rule 1ob-5
Dismissed Upon a Finding That Alleged Misrepresentations Were for a
Purpose Other Than Defrauding Purchasers.-Quarterly and annual reports
of the Belock Corporation concealed substantial overcharges to the government,
with the result that the report overstated the corporation's assets, past income,
and prospective income. When the overcharges became public, the price of
Belock securities dropped. The plaintiffs alleged that they purchased their
securities in reliance on the accuracy of the reports. The complaint also al-
leged that the defendants, directors of the corporation, knew or should have
known that the reports were false, and that the dissemination of the reports
"'was intended to, and did have the effect of artificially inflating the market
prices of Belock' securities."' Recovery was sought under section 10b of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and rule lOb-5.3 The court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground that the fraud was not "'in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . .'" as required by sec-
tion 10b.4 Heit v. Weitzen, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91701 (S.D.N.Y. June
9, 1966).
i. Heit v. Weitzen, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91701, at 95580 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1966).
2. 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964): "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange- ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors."
3. The Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated rule 10b-5: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
4. Heit v. Weitzen, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91701, at 95580 (S.DN.Y. June 9, 1966).
The court stated as a further objection that there was an insuficient allegation of fraud.
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Since the falsification of the reports was for the purpose of concealing
the overcharges to the government-and not for the purpose of defrauding
purchasers of the corporation's securities-the court concluded that the com-
plaint was "devoid of the statement of any facts that the fraud complained
of was perpetrated by the defendants 'in connection with any purchase or sale'
of Belock's stock or debentures." 5 The court quoted from Howard v. Levin 0
as follows:
The instant complaint is fatally defective for the allegations here do not show the
gravamen of defendants' activities to be any wise "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security" as those words have been construed in their statutory setting.
Whatever fraud is alleged here (it is in bare skeletal form) is directed against the
government, notwithstanding its possible incidental market impact. Furthermore, de-
fendants or persons associated with them did not participate in the security trans-
actions involved.7
The final sentence quoted goes beyond the question of purpose and suggests
an attempt to return to the requirement of some semblance of contract privity
between defendant and plaintiff in a suit under rule 10b-5. In support of its
statement, the Howard court cited Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television
Corp.," a case in which the defendants, wishing to dispose of their stock holdings,
Here, the court relied on the case of Howard v. Levine, Dkt. No. 65 Civ. 2148, L. S.D.N.Y.,
Nov. 24, 1965. The Howard court cited two cases in support of its dismissal of the
complaint on grounds of insufficient allegation of fraud. In O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp.
235 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), there was no misrepresentation by the
defendants. In Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the complaint
did not allege scienter on the part of the defendants. The instant complaint dearly alleged
both misrepresentation by the defendants and purchase by the plaintiffs. The allegation of
scienter, however, was less clear. In one paragraph of the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants "'had knowledge or notice'" of the falsity of the reports. CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 91701, at 95578. The terminology used in the Howard complaint was: "'The de-
fendants had or were charged with knowledge of the facts alleged . . . .'" Id. at 95580. It
is conceded that this allegation standing alone would not be sufficient to withstand a motion
to dismiss. In another paragraph, however, the complaint alleged that "the dissemination
[of the statements] ...was 'intended to, and did, have the effect of artificially inflating
the market prices of Belock's' securities." Id. at 95578. Further, in a memorandum in op-
position to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs said that "the defendants knew
that the statements and reports issued, filed and disseminated were false .... " Memorandum
of Plaintiffs in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, p. 10, Heit v. Weitzen, CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ff 91701 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1966). Since in deciding a motion to dismiss the court
must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it would seem that
the court should have either found the allegation sufficient to withstand such a motion, or dis-
missed with leave to amend. Since the court did neither, it can be concluded that the in-
sufficiency of this segment of the complaint was not pivotal, and that the thrust of the de-
cision was toward the issue of purpose.
5. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91701, at 95580.
6. Dkt. No. 65 Civ. 2148, S.D.N.Y., Nov. 24, 1965.
7. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91701, at 95580.
8. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
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had issued a false report concerning their company in order to induce pur-
chase of its stock by the public. The plaintiffs had purchased the stock, al-
though from persons other than the defendants. Their complaint alleged that
the defendants "knew that 'persons such as the plaintiffs and others similarly
situated' would rely . . .-9 on the reports in purchasing stock, but it failed to
allege reliance by the plaintiffs on the accuracy of the reports. The court dis-
missed the complaint, referring to a need for some "semblance of privity" be-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendants. 10 The applicability of that decision
to a case like the instant case is limited by two factors: the failure to allege
reliance and the failure of the court to explain the phrase "semblance of
privity." The nature of the securities market is such that strict contract privity
is rarely found and almost impossible to establish. It is likely that the court
would have been satisfied in that case had the defendants' sale and the plain-
tiffs' purchase been approximately contemporaneous. The court accordingly ex-
cepted from the range of its decision a situation in which there was con-
temporaneity and reliance, and it granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their
complaint.'" Subsequent courts have refused to require either contract privity
or even participation by both parties in a transaction of purchase or sale.' 2
The defendants in the instant case did not attempt to argue for such a re-
quirement.
Remaining to be determined is the minimum connection required when the
misrepresentation is made through the medium of a false financial report. To
require that the fraud be aimed at the particular plaintiffs involved would be
an effective return to a privity requirement; such a strict limitation has been
rejected by the courts.13
9. Id. at 704.
10. Id. at 706.
11. Id. at 706-07.
12. E.g., Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), where insiders
deliberately announced a low dividend, intending to depress the price of the stock so that
they could acquire it themselves. When the plaintiffs, who had sold their stock because of
the low dividend, brought suit, the court refused to grant a motion to dismiss because of
lack of privity. The court noted that "the fact that there is no privity of contract does not
amount to a fatal defect . . . ." Id. at 245. Accord, New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer,
225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), where the court said that "a purchaser or seller ... is
not limited ... to an action against the other party to the purchase or sale; he can sue a
third person if in connection with the purchase or sale that person defrauded him.... It is
immaterial whether the purchase or sale was part of a larger scheme of corporate misman-
agement if the elements of a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are otherwise pres-
ent." Id. at 266. In one case, the entire discussion of the privity issue was as follows:
"Finally, there is no requirement of privity between plaintiffs and defendants, nor of any
'semblance of privity,' for recovery in Section 10(b) actions." Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91817, at 95799 (ND. Ind. Sept. 23, 1966). See, e.g.,
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir 1956) ; Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co, 226 F.
Supp. 972, 978 (S.I.N.Y. 1964); cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co, 258 F. Supp. 262, 293
(1966).
13. E.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Cochran v.
Channing Corp, 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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False reports issued for the purpose of inducing purchase or sale by the
public have been found to be a sufficient connection.14 No previous case,
however, has turned primarily on the fact that the report was issued for a
purpose other than that of defrauding purchasers. In Texas Continental Lije
Ins. Co. v. Dunne,15 the defendants sold municipal bonds worth $2,000,000
to B. J. Cage, who paid $335,000 in cash and gave a note for the remainder.
The prospectus issued by the defendants did not mention the fact that the
sale of the bonds was on credit. The plaintiff bought the bonds from Cage
in reliance on the prospectus. The value of the bonds depended upon Cage's
meeting the payments on the bonds. He defaulted, and they became worthless.
The plaintiff based its suit on the fact that there was an intentional misrepre-
sentation by the defendants. No allegations were made concerning the de-
fendants' motives or goals. Yet the Sixth Circuit ruled that "the conspiracy
did not terminate when the bonds were sold to Cage. The fraud permeated
and affected the entire issue of bonds which defendants placed in the channels
of trade and any purchaser had a right to rely on the prospectus .. . ."10 Three
elements are common to the Texas Continental case and the instant case: lack
of actual contract privity; reliance on a false report; and a scheme whose
purpose was not that of defrauding purchasers. 17 Yet the Texas Continental
court found liability because of the plaintiff's "right to rely" on the report and
because the practice of resale was "well known" to defendants.1
8
This position is consistent with the common law, which provides a primary
source for interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act.19
The existence in the federal securities laws of such undefined terms as "fraud"
and "misconduct" indicate that these terms were expected to be understood against
the background of common law....
14. E.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964), where
false financial reports were filed to induce purchase by the public. This was held to be a
sufficient connection with the ensuing purchases, despite the lack of contract privity,
15. 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
16. Id. at 249.
17. The ultimate purpose of the scheme was the use of the proceeds of the sale by the
city to make improvements which would benefit the property of the defendants' employer.
The plaintiff did not introduce evidence to prove the defendants' intent to defraud. The
court held that "the intentions of the defendants are properly inferable from their acts ....
Ibid. This statement was the extent of its discussion of intent and purpose.
18. Ibid.
19. Civil liability under rule 10b-5 was derived first from use of the common law rule
that violation of a statute passed to protect members of a certain class gives rise to a
cause of action by a member of that class. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (EJD. Pa. 1946). In Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F. 2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951),
the court required that a complaint under rule lob-5 allege "fraud," clearly referring to the
common law. See also McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 836 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961); Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961).
[Vol. 35
Thus, almost all courts which have considered the basis for a cause of action under
lob-5 have placed reliance upon the common law principle . . . that civil liability
should exist against the violator of a legislative . . . enactment who causes harm to
the interest intended to be protected by the enactment.20
Professor Loss has concluded that "because of the legislative background it
seems reasonable to assume at the very least that the most liberal common law
views on these questions should govern under the statutes."2'
It is well settled in the common law that intent and purpose are not coter-
minal, as was suggested by the Howard court in its reference to the market
impact of the false reports as "incidental." Cases such as Garratt v. Dailey23
have established that when a person knows with substantial certainty that a
certain act will have a certain result, he cannot do the former without intending
the latter.23 Motive and purpose are not relevant on the issue of intent. Dean
Prosser is explicit on this point:
It is well settled that, except as to the issue of punitive damages, (the ultimate pur-
pose] . . . is of no importance. The fact that the defendant was disinterested . . .
will not absolve him from liability, so long as he did in fact intend to mislead ....
There is of course no difficulty in finding the required intent to mislead where it ap-
pears that the speaker believes his statement to be false.24
In the instant case, it was alleged that the defendants knew with substantial
certainty that investors would rely on the financial reports, as such reports are
a primary source of information for the public. The allegation should have been
sufficient, unless some policy consideration justified limiting liability under rule
lOb-5 beyond the limitations of the common law. The defendants suggested
in their memorandum that if the plaintiffs recovered in the instant case, a
cause of action would lie every time a corporation president embezzled money,
causing a tumbling market in his company's stock -.2 5 They placed the instant
case on a level with every case where corporate mismanagement was not re-
flected in the books. If purchasers of stock were allowed to recover every time
that there was corporate mismanagement, a legitimate question of public policy
might be raised. However, that situation is not found in the instant case, where
it was alleged that the persons responsible for issuing the report knew at the time
they did so that the report was false.
20. Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule 10B-S: A Suggestion for Replacing the
Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L.J. 658, 666 & n.42 (1965). This comment is an excellent
apology for the use of common law principles in applying the securities statutes.
21. 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1435 (2d ed. 1961). (Footnotes omitted.)
22. 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955). Accord, Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302
N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950), in which it was stated that "it is axiomatic that one intends
the natural consequences of his own acts .... 1" Id. at 71, 96 N.E. 2d at 182.
23. Accord, Pollock, Torts 34 (9th ed. 1912).
24. Prosser, Torts § 102, at 715 (3d ed. 1964). (Footnotes omitted.)
25. This is the example used in the Memorandum of Defendant Stanley R. Grant in
Support of the Motion to Dismiss, p. 30, Heit v. Weitzen, CCFI Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 91701
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1966).
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The Securities Exchange Act was enacted in order to protect investors and
safeguard the public interest. The plaintiffs here are within the protected class.
If their cause of action were sustained, corporate insiders would be held to a
higher standard of honesty in publishing financial information for the buying
public.26 If the decision in the instant case is followed, the purpose underlying
an insider's fraud will shield him from liability to those whom the statute
was passed to protect. It seems, therefore, that the public interest would be
better served by making purpose and motive as irrelevant under rule 10b-5,
as they are in the common law.
26. In the landmark case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441
(1931), a similar question of public policy was discussed. The court noted that the liability
of an accountant who was negligent in preparing a balance sheet was limited, while that
of one who issued the same balance sheet deliberately was not. In cases of fraud, any
foreseeable plaintiff could recover. The point made by court was that too severe a penalty
for negligence might discourage men from entering the field, while a stringent penalty for
dishonesty would not affect honest men. It is submitted that the same reasoning applies
under 10b-5.
